We introduce a masking strategy for hardware that prevents any side-channel attacker from recovering uniquely the secret key of a cryptographic device. In this masking scheme, termed homomorphic, the sensitive data is exclusive-ored with a random value that belongs to a given set. We show that if this masking set is concealed, then no information about the cryptographic key leaks. If the masking set is public (or disclosed), then any (high-order) attack reveals a group of equiprobable keys. Those results are applied to the case of the AES, where sensitive variables are bytes. To any mask corresponds a masked substitution box. We prove that there exists a homomorphic masking with 16 masks (hence a number of substitution boxes equal to that of the same algorithm without masking) that resists mono-variate first-, second-, and third-order side-channel attacks. Furthermore, even if the masking set is public, each byte of the correct key is found only ex aequo with 15 incorrect ones, making the side-channel analysis insufficient alone -the remaining key space shall be explored by other means (typically exhaustive search). Thus, our homomorphic masking strategy allows both to increase the number of side-channel measurements and to demand for a final non negligible brute-forcing (of complexity 16 N B = 2 64 for AES, that has NB = 16 substitution boxes). The hardware implementation of the Rotating Substitution boxes Masking (RSM) is a practical instantiation of our homomorphic masking countermeasure.
INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems that contain cryptography must be protected against side-channel analyses, to prevent attackers from exploiting information that leaks out of the system. Typical side-channels are the (instant) power consumption and the radiated electromagnetic field. The side-channel conveys a noisy image of internal variables right to the attacker. Important variables are those termed sensitive, that depend both on a varying input known by the attacker and on a constant inner data. In the context of block ciphers, they can typically be a part (e.g. one byte) of the plaintext (or of the ciphertext) and of the key (or of the key schedule). In addition, a sensitive variable shall depend on small parts of cryptographic key, e.g. bytes of it. This allows for a divide-and-conquer approach, where the key is recovered byte by byte (as in the case of AES [13] ). To prevent those attacks, countermeasures are applied. Masking (refer to [8, Chap. 9] ) is a large class of them; it consists in randomizing the computations so that the leakage becomes less dependent on the sensitive variables. Masking in general applies as well to software and hardware designs.
This article brings two major contributions to the topic of masking, with application to hardware implementations. We introduce a masking strategy that is leakage resilient, while at the same time being applicable to any block cipher. The first contribution is the proof of its absence of leakage if the used masks are kept secret (e.g. alongside with the cryptographic key). The second contribution is a tradeoff between the size w of the masks set (assumed to be public this time) and the complexity of a brute-force search to finish the attack (since the correct key is recovered ex aequo with other incorrect keys).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 describes the studied homomorphic masking scheme. Its vulnerability evaluation is covered in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, the secrecy of the homomorphic masking scheme is studied. Indistinguishability is demonstrated when the masks set is unknown. Otherwise, we prove that the hypotheses on the key bytes converge into an affine space of size less than or equal to 1 w 2 n (where n is the bitwidth of the sensitive variable, e.g. n = 8 for AES). Despite this burden, high-order attacks remain possible. They are discussed in Sec. 5, with the help of simulations. Several protections using only as many masks as identical substitution boxes in the algorithm (e.g. 16 in AES and in PRESENT) are proposed. In the case of AES, it is possible to find a mask set of cardinality w = 16 that thwarts zero-offset attacks of order 1 to d = 3 including. The number of ex aequo key bytes is maximal, i.e. equal to w = 16. The proposed countermeasure is compared in terms of 16th-order success rate with other less educated choices for the masks. This study allows to prove "empirically" that our countermeasure both presents the smallest side-channel leakage and leads to an exhaustive search of maximal difficulty. Eventually, Sec. 6 gives the conclusions and draws some perspectives. The appendix A ends the paper: it recalls known results, for the article to be self-contained.
HOMOMORPHIC MASKING SCHEME
In this article, we are interested in the protection of iterated block ciphers (such as AES). They are made up of linear parts (AddRoundKey, MixColumns and ShiftRows for AES) and non-linear parts (in AES: only SubBytes, an 8 bit to 8 bit bijection). We study the security of a hardware masking scheme, that is assumed to leak a sensitive variable Z, equal to the sum (bitwise, in F n 2 ) of a plaintext X, first masked by a random variable M , and second added to a secret key byte K:
Let us denote by n the common bitwidth of X, M and K. The variable X is a public part of the data involved in the computation (e.g. the plaintext or the ciphertext). The variable K is a secret (e.g. one byte of the key schedule) to recover, constant over all the side-channel observations. Eventually, M is the mask that implements the countermeasure. It is an unpredictable random variable, redrawn fresh at every encryption, that lives in a subset C of F n 2 . Designs featuring a leakage as per Eqn. (1) are numerous. However, it is customary that, in addition to Z, another share leaks M (refer for instance to the setup described in [6] for differential side-channel attacks). Keeping the mask variable M along with the masked variable Z allows for an easy unmasking at the end of the computation (see for instance the architecture with two paths described in [20] ). Masking schemes that leak the mask M solely through Z are those based on precomputed tables (table S ′ in lieu of S); one example is Rotating Sboxes Masking (or RSM [12] ). In RSM, the plaintext X enters masked as X ⊕ M , then goes through linear operations (such as the key K addition, viz. AddRoundKey) with respect to the exclusive-or (i.e. homomorphically in the group (F n 2 , ⊕)), and traverses the substitution boxes (abridged sboxes) that are masked at the input and at the output with masks that make up for the initial masking. This tactic is referred to as Global Look-Up Table  ( GLUT) [15] . For the overhead of this countermeasure to be acceptable, not all possible masked sboxes are precomputed. This amounts to reducing the size of the set C ⊆ F n 2 from 2 n to w = |C| 2 n : the GLUT equation thus becomes:
Thus the size (in units of memory bits) of the required RAM (or ROM) for the masked sboxes is reduced from: n × 2
3n
(when C = F n 2 ) to n × 2 n+2 log 2 (w) . Further, the non-linear sbox is implemented in a look-up table: therefore, the value of the sbox is not computed with logic gates, but accessed from an array (RAM or ROM). This means that its evaluation does not produce glitches (additional spurious leakage resulting from incomplete transitions caused by races between signals). Therefore, attacks like [14] do not apply. Thus the exploitable leakage writes as:
where L is a degree-one pseudo Boolean function (i.e. a function from F n 2 to R). In the sequel, without loss of generality, we assume L is balanced. The fact L is of degree one reflects the hypothesis that each bit is independent, but can be weighted differently. The mask M , uniformly distributed on C, coincides with the mask Min at masked sbox input (in Eqn. (2)).
Also, in RSM, Mout is deterministically known from Min (it is the successor in C); this remains secure because it is not expected that an attacker combines the leakage of two rounds of AES, since this involves too many key bytes ( 5 for AES). Therefore, the GLUT equation simplifies as:
This table occupies a memory of n × 2 n+log 2 (w) = w × (n2 n ), in units of bit, i.e. the size of w unmasked sboxes. Therefore, when w = 16 = NB, there is not overhead in terms of memory for RSM: the NB identical SubBytes tables are traded for 16 different masked sboxes.
VULNERABILITIES OF THE HOMOMOR-PHIC MASKING
The leakage L given in Eqn. (3) can be attacked by various means, namely information-theoretic distinguishers, such as the mutual information I [L ; X, K = k] introduced in [4] , or high-order correlation power analysis (HO-CPA) [10] .
Analysis of the HO-CPA
Information-theoretic distinguishers are generic, hence attractive when the leakage is unknown. When the leakage can be modelled, the HO-CPA of minimal order are known to be more efficient than generic distinguishers [21] . In this case, as the leakage is univariate (i.e. only one intermediate variable leaks), the adequate attacks are the zerooffset correlation power analyses introduced by Waddle and Wagner in [22] . They consist in testing whether the conditional expectation in X = x of a given power d > 0 of the leakage depends on x. Thus, the attacker checks for the feasibility of a dth-order zero-offset attack by computing Var E L d |X, K , and by selecting the smallest d such as this inter-class variance is nonzero. Owing to the linearity in F n 2 of the key addition in Eqn.
For the implementation to remain small (refer to Sec. 2), the random variable M is not uniformly distributed in F succeed. However, it is well known that the success rate of the attack decreases with the attack order [16] ; this is why the preferred choice for d will be
, where the symbols with stars denote the correct values used by the device, and not necessarily known by the attacker. As stated above, the inter-class variance is not a side-channel distinguisher because it takes the same values for all key bytes k ∈ F n 2 . Therefore, an attack with a "model " shall be used. As explained in [17] and recalled in Lemma 3 in Appendix A, the optimal strategy in an HO-CPA attack is to use as a prediction function
But, as L ⋆ is a priori not known exactly by the attacker,
In the sequel, it is abridged as ρ k ⋆ ,k , because the other random variables (viz. X and M ⋆ ) are averaged by the ρ operator. It is proportional to cov k ⋆ ,k , equal to the numerator of ρ k ⋆ ,k , and computed in the next Lemma. Lemma 1. When the actual leakage is given by Eqn. (3) (unknown variables are marked with a star), the covariance cov k ⋆ ,k distinguisher in a dth-order attack is equal to
We can introduce the indicators f ⋆ of C ⋆ and f of C; hence cov k ⋆ ,k is equal to:
Recall the convolution product is commutative and asso-
. (5) When d is even, constant terms shall be added in Eqn. (5), which do not change our conclusions.
Remark 1. Both cov k ⋆ ,k and ρ k ⋆ ,k depend only in the difference k ⋆ ⊕ k between the correct and the guessed key bytes, and not in the actual key byte k ⋆ . Thus the EIS (Equal Images under different Sub-keys 1 ) assumption made in [18] holds for the homomorphic masking.
In the rest of this section 3.1, we derive optimistic results (that are individually already well known), when the attacker knows
Lemma 2 (Autocorrelation maximum at origin). Let g be a pseudo-Boolean function. We have g ⊗ g(x) g ⊗ g(0), with equality for x ∈ {x
this set is a linear structure of f (see [3] ). ker(f ) is the set of x ∈ F n 2 such that the derivative Dxf (y) = f (y)⊕f (x⊕y) of f is constant. ker(f ) is endowed with a space vector structure.
By expressing that y → Dxf (y) is null iff it is constant and that this constant is equal to zero, it can be noticed that the set {x ∈ F n 2 /∀y ∈ F n 2 , f (y) = f (x⊕y)} is equal to ker(f )∩ {x ∈ F n 2 /f (x) = f (0)}. This set is called the space of null linear structures of f . It is a space vector. Notice that the space of null linear structures of f is equal to:
• ker(f ) ∩ supp(f ) if f (0) = 1, and to
The space of linear structures of f and f ′ are identical. In particular, the space of null linear structures of f and f ′ are identical. Let p a bijective linear function and
The space of null linear structures of f ′ is the image of the space of null linear structures of f through p. This holds in particular for a permutation of the coordinates.
We say that two codes (non-necessarily linear) are equivalent if they can be deduced one from the other by a combination of:
• addition of constant κ ∈ F n 2 to all codewords, and • permutation p of 1, n of the codeword coordinates.
Let f and f ⋆ be the indicators of two equivalent codes C and C ⋆ . Then the space of null linear structures of f and f ⋆ have the same cardinality. If g = g ⋆ , the HO-CPA (Eqn. (5)) is sound, i.e. distinguishes the correct key byte, because
The goal of the countermeasure designer is thus to maximize the size of this space vector. The next subsection proves that the maximal size is obtained for affine codes C.
Largest Space of Null Linear Structures
Proof. It is well known that for an affine space C, the set of the x such as x ⊕ C = C is the direction of C.
Proposition 2 (Max. No of ex aequo key bytes).
Let f a Boolean function of weight w. The cardinality of the space of null linear structures of f is at most w, and it equals w if and only if f is the indicator of an affine code.
Proof. We call C the support of f . Without loss of generality (by translation), we can assume 0 ∈ C. Therefore, the set of x such as x ⊕ C = C is included in C and has thus at most |C| elements. It has exactly |C| elements if and only if C is stable by translation of all its elements, which is equivalent to saying that C is a space vector.
SECRECY ANALYSIS OF THE HOMO-MORPHIC MASKING
Instead of using code C, any equivalent code C ⋆ can be used (thereby ensuring an equal security level). First of all, it is observed in Sec. 4.1 that such a substitution does not alter the security because distance enumerator polynomials of equivalent codes are identical. In particular their dual distances are the same. Second, we show in Sec. 4.2 that if the exact equivalent code C ⋆ used in the device is unknown by the attacker, then the homomorphic countermeasure is unconditionally secure. Third, we prove in Sec. 4.3 that if the code C ⋆ is known by the attacker, then the correct key byte k ⋆ cannot be distinguished from bad key bytes k ⋆ ⊕ k, where k is an element from the space of null linear structures of g = L d ⊗ f .
Equivalent Codes Preserve the Security
First of all, we recall the definition of the distance enumerator polynomial. 
where wH is the Hamming weight (∀x ∈ F n 2 , wH (x) = n i=1 xi ∈ 0, n , hence wH takes (n + 1) different values).
Proof. This proposition 3 is well known; we briefly give its proof hereafter. According to the MacWilliams' identity (shown for instance in [2, 7] 
Thus, by identification (in blue color), 1 |C| DC (X +Y, X −Y ) is equal to both:
Two codes are equivalent if they can be deduced one from the other by the combination of an addition with a constant to all codewords and a permutation of the codewords coordinates. As those two transformations are commutative, we shall prove the invariance the distance enumerator polynomial under each operation independently. We denote by B
Remark 4. Let p a permutation of 1, n . Let C and
In the two next subsections 4.2 and 4.3, we illustrate how to take advantage of the invariance of the dual distance by an arbitrary translation of the code (which derives new codes called cosets). For simplification, we assume that the attacker knows the exact leakage model (and thus takes L = L ⋆ ), and attacks at the most appropriate order (for her), i.e. d = d mented in a n × w-bit RAM or ROM for every sbox). Now, it is known that ROM arrays can be reverse-engineered easily 2 . FPGA designs implement the ROMs as RAMs initialized at the boot time (from an encrypted bitstream), and therefore the homomorphic masking countermeasure can be claimed unconditionally secure. For cost reasons, ASIC designs are likely to base their architecture on a ROM, since ROM blocks are far less costly than RAM blocks.
Besides, for the unconditional security to hold on the whole key (the 16 key bytes of the AES), a different code C ⋆ must be used for every sbox. Thus, the total number of memory required is (16 × w) × n2 n bit, which is 16 times more than announced for RSM (recall Eqn. (4)). Actually, in RSM, there is only one code C for the entire AES, hence a memory requirement of w × n2 n bit. As there is only one implementation key byte κ for the 16 sboxes, every cryptographic key byte is offset by the same quantity.
Therefore, it is relevant to investigate the security level of the countermeasure if the masks are public or have been reverse-engineered.
Indistinguishable Keys if the Masking is Public
We assume that the attacker knows C ⋆ (hence C = C ⋆ , or equivalently κ = 0). Despite this knowledge, there remains for the attacker a brute-force exhaustive search. For instance, when C is affine and w = 16, for each of the 16 key bytes of an AES, the side-channel attack manages to reduce the key byte space size from 2 8 to w = 2 4 , but stops at this point (there is no other useful information to extract from the side-channel measurements, i.e. a purported back-tracking is not applicable). The subsequent exhaustive search for the complete key (16 key bytes) can be made prohibitory. In the example of AES, the final key search is 16 16 = 2 64 . Using Rijndael, the initial proposal for AES, with a 32 bytes datapath (NB = 32, and not 16 as in AES [13] ), the final search has complexity 2 128 , i.e. the same complexity as that of brute-forcing the 128-bit key (recall that the key k ⋆ is the primary asset to protect). Notice that the knowledge of the 16 key candidates of one sbox does not help finding the secret key of another sbox. Indeed, such strategy would require to combine the leakages of the two sboxes, which is not permitted in parallel implementations of the homomorphic masking, because all the sboxes are evaluated concomitantly.
Remark 5 (Side-Channel Indistinguishability). Ties ( i.e. ex aequo keys) exist irrespective of the attack order ( i.e. also at orders > d ⊥ C ), thus even for informationtheoretic attacks ( e.g. the MIA [4] ), and so, even without hypothesis on the leakage model L ⋆ .
Our homomorphic masking is thus a provably secure sidechannel resilient countermeasure 3 .
SUCCESS RATES IN THE CASE OF AES

Studied Codes for n = 8
Seven codes C are studied. They are defined in Tab. 1. Their distance enumerator polynomial is given in Tab. 2, and their codewords and null linear structures in Tab. 3.
Here is a verbose description of these codes:
• Code 1 (also nicknamed M 0 1) contains only the 0 element, denoted 0x00 ∈ F 8 2 , and thus represents an unmasked implementation (of lowest security);
• Code 2 (also nicknamed M 1 2) contains two elements, that are 1's complement one from each other; this masking is sufficient to resist first order attacks;
• Codes 3 to 6 contain w = 16 elements of F f5(x) = f4(x ⊕ 0x01)). As shown in Remark 2, the functions f4 and f5 have the same space of null linear structures, namely {0x00}. However, the space of null linear structures of g4 = w 3 H ⊗ f4 is {0x00} whereas that of g5 = w 3 H ⊗ f5 is {0x00, 0x08}. This means that a third-order attack will give one maximal key when the countermeasure uses M 2 16 bis, but two ex aequo when M 2 16 bis2 is used instead 4 Otherwise, codes M 2 16, M 2 16 bis and M 2 16 ter are interesting because they have different B ⊥ 3 values. 3 Notice that indistinguishable keys were already discussed in [9] , but with the limitation that plaintexts had to be formatted and that attacks should restrict to the first round. 
Code # Nickname
Truth table of f , under the form x∈F n 2 {0x55, 0xaa} {0x00, 0xff} 3 {0x02, 0x13, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x6b, 0x77, 0x78, 0x9f, 0xa5, 0xaa, 0xb0, 0xc1, 0xce, 0xd9, 0xf6} {0x00} 4 {0x00, 0x09, 0x1e, 0x33, 0x55, 0x66, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x87, 0xaf, 0xb4, 0xb8, 0xca, 0xd2, 0xdd, 0xe1} {0x00} 5 {0x01, 0x08, 0x1f, 0x32, 0x54, 0x67, 0x6d, 0x7a, 0x86, 0xae, 0xb5, 0xb9, 0xcb, 0xd3, 0xdc, 0xe0} {0x00} 6 {0x0a, 0x0d, 0x13, 0x14, 0x60, 0x67, 0x79, 0x7e, 0xa2, 0xa5, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xce, 0xd0, 0xd7} {0x00, 0x07, 0x19, 0x1e} 7 {0x10, 0x1f, 0x26, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4c, 0x75, 0x7a, 0x85, 0x8a, 0xb3, 0xbc, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0xe0, 0xef} {0x00, 0x0f, 0x36, 0x39, 0x53, 0x5c, 0x65, 0x6a, 0x95, 0x9a, 0xa3, 0xac, 0xc6, 0xc9, 0xf0, 0xff}
• Code 7 (also nicknamed M 3 16) is an affine code equivalent to the linear code C of parameters [8, 4, 4] . It belongs to the only class of equivalent codes C that have d 
2 , where C = {Mi} i∈ 0,16 . In this case, the overhead of the countermeasure is virtually zero, because the number of sboxes is not increased between the unprotected and the protected implementations. Nonetheless, some extra resources are needed for the management of the masks. Nassar et al. report in [12] an implementation in Altera Stratix-II FPGA of a homomorphic masking on AES; they achieve a moderate increase of 40% in memory usage, of 48% in user LUT logic, and a decrease of 34% of the maximal operating frequency.
Simulated High-Order Attacks on RSM
Because of the degeneracy of w = 16 key byte guesses with code 7, we can only evaluate whether the correct key is amongst the 16 first ones. Thus, a 16th-order success rate is computed [19] . By definition, it is the probability that the correct key byte is ranked between 16th to 1st, inclusively. For the mask set corresponding to code 7, this is equivalent to saying that the correct key byte equivalence class is ranked first. In particular, when considering the 16th-order success rate, codes 4 and 5 yield the same result, hence only the results for code 4 are displayed.
In the attack, we consider that L ⋆ is noisy: it is added a random variable N , that follows a centered normal law of variance σ 2 . The simulation results are shown in Fig. 1 for attacks at order d = 3, with 100 experiments (in which both the seed for the random noise and the correct key are updated). As predicted by the theory, the attack does not succeed on the mask set 7 (a.k.a. code M 3 16). Indeed, all the correlations between the cube of the centered traces and any key hypothesis are the same (viz. zero). Thus, the 16th-order success rate is actually converging to 16/256 = 1/16 (which is < 1); 1/16 is the probability of finding the correct key after 16 successive trials without replacement. We call N 80% the number of traces for the 16th-order success rate to overcome 80%. Each point is obtained as follows: 100 attacks are launched, to derive a success rate. In [22] , a high-order masking scheme involving a sharing of a bit into d + 1 shares was studied. It assumes all the shares have an additive noise modeled as a centered Gaussian distribution N (0, σ 2 ). Under these conditions, they prove that:
5 It can be proven that the success rate of a zero-offset dthorder CPA is all the larger as B A recent paper has generalized this law for multibit leakage [16] . To confront these results to our masking scheme (where N 80% is evaluated with a success rate of order 16), we represent in Fig. 3 a N 80% vs σ law in log-log, for the lowest-order attack that works on the given countermeasures. To obtain this figure, we pushed the simulations up to 10 million (≈ 2 23.25 ) traces. Qualitatively, the slope indeed increases with the attack order d, albeit as a 2d (and not d).
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have studied a homomorphic masking scheme, applicable to block ciphers. While linear parts of cryptographic algorithms can be computed homomorphically, non-linear parts cannot. Therefore, the non-linear parts (the sboxes) are stored precomputed for a given pool Figure 3 : Number of traces to achieve a success rate 80% for various noise standard deviations σ.
of masks. The cost of the implementation is all the smaller as this pool is small, which motivates for a homomorphic depleted masking scheme. We prove in this article that when masks are n = 8 bit long, and with the constraint of precomputing only as many (namely w = 16) sboxes as in the original AES algorithm, it is possible to have the AES protected against monovariate attacks of order d = 3.
Furthermore, we analyze this set under the theory of codes. It is an affine subcode of F n 2 . We know that there exists only one class of equivalent codes C of length n = 8, size w = 16, and dual distance d ⊥ C = 4. Still, if the exact member of the class remains secret, the masking can be proven unconditionally secure. If the code has been compromised (or is deliberately made public), then an attacker will exhibit a set of possible key bytes, that is an affine space containing the correct key plus a space vector of size up to w. This demands for the attacker an extra exhaustive search on top of the side-channel attack; if the algorithm can be tuned, this exhaustive search can be made as complex as desired by increasing the number of sboxes. Finally, we illustrate the complexity of the high-order correlation power analyses by computing success rates of order w: the attack requires more than 1 million traces for a noise standard deviation σ 3.5. Therefore, the homomorphic computation countermeasure presented in this article is a strong solution for implementations that can only be attacked by monovariate analysis, such as FPGA or ASIC implementations of Rotating Sboxes Masking (RSM [12] ).
As perspectives, we intend to extend RSM and its security proofs to software implementations.
